Recommended Reading

One, published by NEWSWEEK, "Big Dumb Rockets" by Gregg Easterbrook, as the cover story of their August 17,1987 issue (subsequently summarized by READER's DIGEST in their December 1987 publication) discusses some of the design issues raised by the criteria. The article also explains the economical and political consequences of the criteria on the aerospace community and how the community reacted to its introduction.

The other publication, "Leo On The Cheap" by Lt Col John R. London III, Air University Press, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, October 1994, discusses the engineering problems associated with placing payloads in low earth orbit (LEO) and the work performed by industry in applying the MCD criteria to system and subsystem design. The author also provides background information on existing and proposed launch systems and the reasons why the aerospace community should accept the MCD criteria.

Nevertheless, my effort will be quite extensive. I plan to provide a description, an understanding, and the analytical derivation of the MCD criteria. I also plan to provide the thinking that led to the design of the SM(Semi-Mobile)ICBM and the minimum cost design space launch vehicle (MCD/SLV) and the analytical techniques used in configuring minimum cost systems, subsystems and components. This work will be based mostly on material contained in The Aerospace Corporation report, "Proposed Minimum Cost Space Launch Vehicle System" by A. Schnitt and Col F.W. Kniss, July 1968, and on material contained in unpublished papers and briefings. Personal experiences that may add to the understanding of the problems associated with the use of the criteria will be described.

These are the salient points made by Gregg Easterbrook, albeit circa 1987. Most of these points will be expanded upon in subsequent columns.

• It was feared that the introduction of the MCD/SLV, dubbed the "Big Dumb Booster" (BDB) might undermine Shuttle funding.
• The Soviets apparently took a low-cost approach to space, a conclusion that one may reach by noting the many similarities that appeared to exist between what was known of their hardware and the BDB design.
• The minimum weight/maximum performance criteria was first used, perhaps correctly, in the design of our ICBMs. If there were reasons for thinking that it was the proper design criteria for ICBMs, there were no logical reasons for carrying it over in the design of space vehicles.
• The MCD analysis showed that first stages, as part of a multi-stage expendable SLV, should be the least sophisticated; and that the optimum degree of hardware sophistication increases with each successive, upper stage.
• The Saturn V moon rocket "exemplified the maximum-technology approach."
• The auxiliary ground equipment, whose cost and complexity can be greatly influenced by the propellants used in the launch vehicle, is an important element in minimizing total system cost..
• Both procurement agencies (NASA and the Air Force) and Congress like expensive programs. There is no "political payoff" in programs "designed to save money."
• The industry turned away from the BDB because embracing it would undermine their relations with the procurement agencies and undercut high-cost programs currently under contract and on the horizon, like the aerospaceplane ((now known as the single stage-to-orbit (SSTO) launch vehicle)) and the space station.
• TRW fabricated a 250,000 pound thrust, short duration, test engine (later successfully tested at Edwards AFB) for an extremely low cost. The injector design was based on the (10,000 pound thrust) LEMDE rocket engine. The LEMDE engine was used in the descent module of the Apollo moon lander...... (I selected the main propulsion engines for the BDB to be larger versions of the LEMDE because of its design simplicity, reliability, low cost, throttlability, and likely scalability to multi-million pound thrust levels-in essence, because it appeared to be the "rubber" rocket engine that fit an overall design and development plan.)
• Boeing (fully appreciative of the MCD criteria and not under contract to develop or build SLVs) recognized the potential of the TRW engine and the MCD/SLV. Using in-house funds they fabricated a stage scaled to match a 250,000 pound thrust engine to which the TRW engine was attached for exhibition purposes. However, Boeing lost interest in the MCD/SLV when "NASA and the Air Force had agreed that all future payloads would use the shuttle."
• To maximize Shuttle use, NASA obtained a monopoly in launching commercial satellites (rescinded after the Challenger accident). Since 1972, NASA "lobbied against further rocket research." In addition, industry's interest in the MCD/SLV was stifled by NASA whose stated intent was to use the Shuttle to build and service the space station.

• A study of launch vehicle costs shows that if these costs could be drastically reduced, say, by an order of magnitude or more, many significant programs might be realized or sustained.
• Although the U.S. has adequate launch capability, we may lose out against lower-cost, foreign competition.
• There are a number of new launch vehicle concepts under study and development, but it is wondered whether any of them can appreciably reduce cost.
• Our heritage in designing to the minimum weight/maximum performance criteria may effectively hinder a drastic change in design philosophy.
• It is a myth that space vehicles must be complicated, delicate, and costly. Launch vehicle components built in a "foundry" may be practicable and the way to go.
• The right design choices, particularly the choice of the propulsion system-the system that has the most impact on the overall vehicle design-determines whether life-cycle cost of a new SLV can compete with the recurring costs of existing SLVs.
• Finally, in 1988, some of the terminology used in the MCD criteria became somewhat acceptable in the aerospace community. The Air Force, in announcing their Advanced Launch System project (later canceled) stated that one of its objectives is to reduce costs. More specifically they stated that weight may be traded for cost in the vehicle design; this may be regarded as an significant break with the minimum weight/maximum performance criteria. This was followed in a 1989 paper given by a Pakistani who featured his (national) vehicle as having been designed to the MCD criteria. A DoD/NASA paper published in 1991 concluded that the "pathway to low-cost, highly operable space transportation" essentially lies in adopting the MCD criteria.
• There is a strong link between the cost of an SLV and the complexity and cost of the payload it carries. As launch cost in $/pound of payload decreases, so can the payload cost decrease and the reliability increase. (In later columns I plan to show this relationship graphically and explain how a designer can approach the payload design problem analytically.)
• Nevertheless, there is not much enthusiasm for minimum-cost launch vehicles as exemplified by NASA's and the Air Force's sponsorship, respectively, of the SSTO and the EELV programs. (See Column dated January 26, 1997. NASA hopes to achieve low operating costs by advancing technology while the Air Force is relying mainly on existing technology except for a few components that are apparently designed to guidelines derived from the MCD criteria.)
• After reviewing the numerous SLV system studies currently being performed by major aerospace contractors and newly organized companies, all using the MCD criteria, Col London issues a clarion call, a plea, to those responsible for policy to fully and quickly accept the MCD criteria. He further calls for the design an MCD/SLV using current technology.

Do government agencies such as NASA and DoD have a preference for high cost programs? What do you think? [clicking on "you" opens link to discussions that followed the initial posting of this column]

Next Column: The start of a personal account of the work that led to the development of the MCD criteria.

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