OTA Experiences

A description of OTA's "assessment process" may be found on the Internet¹. As further described by M. Granger Morgan of the Pittsburgh Post Gazette²: "Because of the political environment in which it has operated OTA reports rarely draw definitive conclusions. Rather... they summarized the technical facts, identified problems, laid out alternatives, and discussed their pros and cons." (OTA was legislated out of existence in 1995.)

On June 12, 1987, I received a call from a member of the OTA staff. After a brief explanation of the function of OTA, he outlined a task assigned to them by the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. They were to assess the Big Dumb Booster as part of a study by which lower cost space systems might be achieved. The assessment was to be made by having a one-day "workshop" attended by representatives of industry, the procurement agencies, others I chose to invite, and myself. The views expressed at the workshop would be used in preparing a report, planned to be issued the following Spring.

I vigorously objected to OTA's assessment approach and declined to partake in an effort in which I would be greatly outnumbered. Besides expressing this thought, I added:

• If they wished to comply with the request to study the feasibility of lowering space system costs, OTA would do better by evaluating the MCD criteria rather than the BDB since the BDB is only one application of the criteria.
• The applicability of the MCD criteria to payload design should be of considerable interest to Congress and should be addressed.
• OTA appears to be going over previously well tilled ground. Most major aerospace contractors have studied the MCD criteria and found no flaws. Some contractors have designed their version of a BDB, while some have contributed to Aerospace's design by fabricating appropriate, MCD hardware, namely, TRW and Boeing, as described in previous Columns.
• Understandably, most of the industry as well as those at the policy-making levels of the procurement agencies made it known directly or indirectly that they were against the adoption of the MCD criteria.
• The workshop looks like a time-waster and a time-delayer at a time when the National Research Council and President Reagan were being asked to approve new, large space programs such as the ALS (Air Force/NASA Advanced Launch System) Program and the Space Station.
• I would appreciate receiving any documentation regarding Congress' request of OTA, and OTA's assessment plans in response.

• Dated September 17, 1986. From the Senate Committee on Science and Transportation. "Identify and evaluate those key technologies which, if properly funded, might produce the greatest increase in launch vehicle capability, the most dramatic reductions in cost, and the greatest contribution to U.S. industrial competitiveness across a range of high-technology markets;..."
• Dated March 6, 1987. From the House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. "The Congress will need credible information regarding...the feasibility of achieving critical technical and cost improvements in space transportation systems... Identify and evaluate those key technologies which, if developed in a timely manner, might produce significant increases in launch capability, substantial reductions in cost, and a major contribution to U.S. industrial competitiveness across a range of high-technology markets... Identify and evaluate a range of low-cost, low-technology space transportation options and examine the trade-offs that need to be made... Assess technologies in spacecraft design and operation which critically relate to launch vehicle performance..."
• Dated March 10, 1987. From the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation. He referred to the September 17, 1986, request and added, "I am still interested in OTA conducting this study as originally requested."
• Dated March 12, 1987 and Revised April 10, 1987. An OTA prepared study plan entitled, "Advanced Space Transportation Technologies," was to answer the committees' requests. Of the eight tasks listed, the following three are of immediate interest. 1) "identify launch systems capable of serving the plausible range of demand for space transportation over the next twenty years;" 2) "identify and evaluate key technologies - including low-cost, low-technology systems - that might increase performance and reduce the cost of space transportation while contributing to U.S. industrial competitiveness;" 3) "determine how changes in spacecraft design and operations will influence launch technology."

"Thank you for sending me information that completely describes your study program... every few years, a broad study of space launch vehicles is undertaken by some agency, and 'low-cost, low-technology systems' are part of the study. Hardware based on the minimum cost concept are always shown to be losers... It seems that it is your turn to repeat the study which, as I indicated during our conversation, is [viewed as] just another bureaucratic boondoggle." In the closing paragraph, I implored OTA to review and evaluate all the work that has already been done on the MCD criteria and its applications by The Aerospace Corp. and by many industrial contractors, and to promptly reach a conclusion relative to its value.

I sought the advice of my politically astute friends. All advised that I would do better by accepting participation in the workshop, and that I should try to get as many of my supporters invited as possible. OTA was described as an organization of high integrity and that I would get a fair shake even if it comes later than I would like.

When the OTA representative called again to announce that the workshop will take place on December 1, 1987, I accepted the invitation to attend. I remember feeling buoyed by the Big Dumb Booster cover story that appeared in the August 17, 1987, issue of NEWSWEEK³. I identified five supporters who I wished to be placed on the invitation list. The representative assured me that the workshop results would be the subject of an extensive report that I would get to review prior to its release the following Spring.

Close to the end of November, I received an unexpected draft copy of a report that was prepared under contract to OTA, "A Technical Analysis of Low Cost, Low Technology Options for Space Transportation," by Dr. Russell C. Drew, principal investigator. The report was sent to all of the invited workshop participants, and they were asked to submit written reviews.

I found the report to be comprehensive and competently written with one major omission. It did not discuss the validity and the implications of the MCD criteria in the design of space hardware, both launch vehicles and payloads. The basis of his analysis was the NEWSWEEK story rather than the Aerospace report⁴ that contained the derivation of the MCD criteria and its application to a space launch vehicle. The Aerospace report provided the material on which many of the preceding Columns were based. In my written review I emphasized that, although the optimum hardware derived from the MCD criteria, particularly for first stages, was more commercial- than aerospace-looking, the term "low technology" was inappropriate. The term carried a negative connotation for an industry that has made notable accomplishments through advancements in technology.

In spite of my efforts, the workshop subject was called, "Low Cost, Low Technology Space Transportation Options." Furthermore, I was never able to get OTA to drop "low technology" from any of their subsequently prepared material perhaps because it was the expression used in the House Committee letter.

Most unfortunately, of the five people I invited to the workshop, only one was able to make it, and another sent a substitute. Among the attendees, there were several representatives of agencies/organizations who had been MCD adherents in the past, but were now on the other side of the fence. Before the session started, two attendees whispered pleasant greetings to me from individuals in their organization before they quickly walked away.

The workshop was conducted in an informal manner. The attendees sat at tables arraigned in a large quadrangle. The proceedings were not recorded. There was an agenda that included two, short presentations: one on "Low technology Propulsion Concepts," by the TRW representative, and the other on "Structure and Materials Issues," by a NASA representative. We were asked to submit prepared statements to OTA and to all of the attendees. This was followed by verbal statements of more of the same. It did not take long before I became frustrated and demoralized. During one of the many recesses, I unsuccessfully pleaded with the OTA representatives to conduct an evaluation of the MCD criteria that I considered to be the primary and unresolved issue.

There was one positive outcome of the workshop. The NASA presentation, given by Dr. John Davis of Langley, showed how the redesign of the BDB, using advanced technology composite materials, could reduce the vehicle size to a fraction of its former self. Current costs of composite materials indicate that the previously estimated cost of the BDB could be reduced as well. 

1. http://www.wws.princeton.edu/%7Eota/html2/proces.html [link broken when checked in 2004]
   
2. http://www.wws.princeton.edu/%7Eota/html2/ota95.html [link broken when checked in 2004]
   
3. Column dated February 5, 1997, "Recommended Reading."
4. A. Schnitt and Col F.W. Kniss, "Proposed Minimum Cost Space Launch Vehicle System," The Aerospace Corporation Report TOR-0158(3415-15)-1, July 1, 1968.

Do you have any experience with the now defunct OTA? [no discussions were submitted for this question]

Next Column: My experiences with OTA continued, including advice from my much less scandalous "deep throat."

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