OTA Experiences Continued

Twenty-two individuals participated in the workshop. Their names and affiliations are listed in the OTA report on the proceedings of the meeting.¹ Nine participants represented established aerospace companies, five were affiliated with NASA centers and three with the Air Force; the remaining five were composed of two consultants, two representatives of small companies, and one representative of The Aerospace Corp. I had added the Aerospace and TRW representatives to the invitation list..

Seating was provided for visitors off to one side of the workshop group. Most visitors did not stay for the entire proceedings. I recognized a group from NASA Headquarters and the Navy. The press was barred from the room.

Several weeks before the meeting, each invitee received copies of the workshop agenda and the recently published NEWSWEEK article.² The cover letter explained that the article was enclosed "in order to familiarize you with the concept of the low cost, low technology launch vehicle and some of the controversy surrounding it... " The article contained little in terms of an engineering discussion of the MCD criteria and its application to an SLV, but rather extensive criticisms of industry, NASA, and the Air Force, and why each participated in killing the concept. This was hardly suitable background information for workshop discussions of "the technical feasibility, advisability, and cost-effectiveness of developing simple or low technology space launch vehicles," as requested in the cover letter.

Not all the attendees submitted prepared material. I obtained copies of twelve submittals, but there might have been more. Since there were no verbatim records made of the proceedings, I made as many notes as possible. From what was said, I fully believe that, except for the TRW and Aerospace representatives and the Air Force manager of the Advanced Launch System (ALS) Program, no participant had an understanding of the MCD criteria. Following were some of the more pertinent comments - both negative and positive - as they reflect upon the MCD criteria.

Negative Comments

• Hardware assemblies composed of many, complex components are generally highly reliable; example: an aircraft turbojet engine. Simple structures are not inherently more reliable.
• There is no clear advantage in using the "Big Dumb Booster" (BDB) design approach.
• The path to lower costs is through high technology.
• Least costs can be achieved by making SLVs fully reusable.
• The BDB is a step backwards. Low costs can be achieved by building on existing technology.
• More than half of the recurring costs support a "standing army," and changing the SLV design will have little effect on the size of the army.^A
• There is a "... perceived lack of technology base... " in designing for minimum cost.
• Larger tank sizes may require the abandonment of existing manufacturing facilities and the development of new capabilities.
• Solid rocket strap-ons have a better technical base than minimum cost liquid rockets.
• Low cost launch vehicles are inordinately large.

Positive Comments

• The Air Force manager of the ALS Program stated that the MCD criteria is being used in their design studies.^B
• It was revealed that past industry studies that showed higher costs for MCD hardware used cost estimating relationships (CERs) that were based on historical costs of hardware designed to the minimum weight/maximum performance criteria. Because MCD hardware usually weighed more, and the CERs were weight-based, its costs were estimated to be higher. Consequently hardware designed to the MCD criteria was always shown to be a loser.^C
• The 1969 TRW study of a low cost, expendable SLV resulted in recurring costs of one-fourth to one-fifth the cost of comparable SLVs of that era.
• Lowering launch costs provided the potential for reducing payload costs as well.
• As mentioned in the preceding Column, the size of the BDB can be reduced by using advanced composites in lieu of steel, and the cost can be further reduced as well.

At the end of March 1988, when I still did not receive a draft copy of the report on the workshop, I called OTA. I was told that Congress had put the BDB "on a back burner." I was further told that OTA is preparing a "buyer's guide" on SLVs in compliance with the requests of the Congressional committees. (This report was released in July and will be discussed in the next Column.)

I called OTA again at the end of June to learn the status of the workshop report. This time I was told that it is scheduled for completion at the end of July. However, its distribution will be limited to internal use only.

The delay and these comments raised my frustration level to the point that I felt compelled to impose upon some of my friends to try to learn what is going on at OTA, friends who had previously been in government service. I received a call from someone I trusted very much, a personal "deep throat." He advised me that the MCD criteria will not gain acceptance, and that I cannot buck the aerospace industry, the procurement agencies, and the government - known as the "iron triangle."^D

References

1. "BIG DUMB BOOSTERS A Low-Cost Space Transportation Option? An OTA Background Paper," February 1989. (Available for reading/downloading at http://www.wws.princeton.edu/%7Eota/html2/caty 89.html.)
2. Gregg Easterbrook, "Big Dumb Rockets," NEWSWEEK, August 17, 1987. (Column dated February 5, 1997, lists some of the significant statements made in this article.)
3. William C. Strobl, "Cutting space launch costs with simulation," AEROSPACE AMERICA, September 1997, pp 23, 24.

Notes

1. The standing army is composed of all operations personnel who monitor the SLV and payload prior to launch and during flight, and personnel who must be kept at hand to inspect the hardware and to quickly perform repairs as necessary. I contend that the size of the standing army is directly related to the SLV and payload designs. Simpler, more rugged SLV's and payloads require a smaller army. In fact, by fully adhering to the MCD criteria, the SLV and payload designs are optimized in conjunction with the cost of operations, including the costs incurred by unreliability; such as, downtime, failure and failure analysis.
2. I had not come across any article on the technical aspects of the ALS program until last month.³ Although Strobl does not spell out that the ALS program used the MCD criteria, it is quite apparent from his description of the design process that, not only was the criteria used, but an extensive computer program was developed to facilitate minimum cost design, a program I had proposed in a 1962 paper. As explained in Column dated March 27, 1997, "Methods of Design Analysis," I abandoned the development of the computer program at the time I was asked to design the MCD/SLV in several months. Reference 3 also described some specific design results of the ALS Program; viz.:
• "... a small relief in weight constraints significantly reduced the cost of engines and structure... For example, the cost of a new ALS engine could be reduced significantly if the weight constraint were relieved by only 3% of the total system weight."
• "For about a 25% weight increase [of a new turbopump volute] the cost for the new design is only about 8% of the cost of the traditional design."
3. According to Strobl³, the same brand of CERs were NOT used in defining the nonrecurring and recurring costs for the SLV designed under the ALS Program. The ALS Program used a costing methodology that was commensurate with the hardware sophistication. (This point will be expanded upon in the next Column.)
4. Several years later I heard the term iron triangle used in a discussion of the political aspects of the aerospace community. Hedrick Smith, the author/reporter, explained the operation of the triangle in a PBS TV program.

Do you have any experience with the now defunct OTA? [no discussions were submitted for this question]

Next Column: OTA's Draft Report on "Big Dumb Boosters".

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