A Relevant Happening

One of the stated, alarming consequences of this interface with the Chinese was that they might now be able to improve the accuracy of their ballistic missiles. The politically charged situation has embroiled many branches of government. Most alarming to me was that no one asked why the Chinese were launching our satellites in the first place although I do recall reading one article, which explained without elaboration, that Chinese rockets were available and were less costly than ours. No one chose to explore why the Chinese have been launching our satellites during the years of the Bush and Clinton Administrations while at the same time no suitable American launch vehicle was under development or in the initial stages of production. I felt that a review of the many failed and current NASA and Air Force programs to develop low-cost launch vehicles would be of interest, although I have partially covered this subject in previous Columns.

In gathering references, I came across an article by Gregg Easterbrook ⁴ on the "OP-ED" page of the June 2, 1998, New York Times in which he discusses the question I have chosen to ask and answer. In his enviable style he writes: "... the root-cause question of the scandal has gone unasked - why are American satellites sitting atop Chinese launches at all, rather than arcing skyward from the space installations American taxpayers have spent billions to construct?"

Easterbrook discusses the principal reasons for this situation. He also discusses current launch vehicle development programs that are meant to reduce costs. I plan to add to his discussion and explain personal beliefs, some from an insider's point of view. I will also state my views of current NASA and Air Force launch vehicle programs which, by the way, differ from those of Easterbrook's.

Easterbrook makes the following poignant points:

• "... NASA and Pentagon officials" have been "reluctant to build low-cost rockets... for fear of losing the golden goose of high launching costs." Moreover: "To justify manned space flight and the space shuttle, NASA has for three decades shunned research into the type of relatively inexpensive rockets China and other nations have featured."
• "Other American satellites have flown on French or Russian rockets, which also charge appreciably less than their American counterparts ⁵."
• American launch vehicles, on a dollar per pound of satellite basis, cost more than twice that of the Chinese. For a Loral size satellite, this represents a difference of about "$50 million or more."
• Preceded by several extremely hi-tech and costly programs that were canceled, current programs designed to reduce launch costs are the Pentagon sponsored [family of] Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle[s] and NASA's recoverable, single stage (X-33) vehicle. "... full-scale operation of either design is years away."
• "Several start-up companies... are now designing what may become the first generation of entirely private space vehicles."
• "... American space policy not only created the conditions that led to the satellite deals with China, but it also has jeopardized its own hopes for the future."

Then I heard that NASA was behind the cancellation because they did not want a launch vehicle to compete on a cost basis with the Shuttle. Besides, the Shuttle needed as many payloads to launch as possible in order to justify its development and to amortize the large research and development costs. Many years later I heard that launch vehicle policy emanates from the White House. Lt Col London, ⁷ who researched the subject of MCD meticulously and in fine detail, identified the agency that blocked the MCD criteria and the SLV as "the government." I currently believe that all of these agencies were and are still involved in formulating and maintaining this policy.

During the past several decades DoD and NASA have spent billions of dollars upgrading the Space Shuttle and the expendable launch vehicles. New vehicle programs were also worked on and they all carried the requirement to reduce cost appreciably. The gap in the low payload weight range was filled by the development of the Pegasus, and its larger derivative, the Taurus. A considerable sum of money was spent on the National AeroSpace Plane (NASP) program, an unrealistic launch vehicle concept. The concept required an unreasonable amount of advanced technology and development and was eventually canceled. The "NASP aimed to develop a new type of supersonic combustion ramjet (scramjet) engine that could propel an aircraft to near-orbital speeds ⁸." The gap in the high payload weight range was filled by the development of the Titan IV vehicles, extensions of the Titan family.

A serious attempt at reducing costs was made in the design of the Advanced Launch System, an expendable rocket configuration. The MCD criteria was reputed to have been used, at least partly, in the design ⁹. However its projected nonrecurring and recurring costs were erroneously raised. This may have contributed to its cancellation, although the official reason given was that it was no longer needed because of the demise of the SDI program.

In recent years, the Air Force has been supporting the development of the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV) program. These vehicles are scheduled to become operational in the early part of the next decade. They are modified existing expendables. One of the expressed purpose of the program is to reduce recurring costs "by a minimum of 25%, with an objective of 50% ^10,11." This range of cost reduction will approximately meet foreign competition. In the future, however, the cost of foreign launchers may be less.

NASA is not contributing realistically to a reduction in launch costs with their current program. Their effort is to develop a single-stage-to-orbit, fully recoverable launch vehicle. My views of this program are extremely negative ¹².

I concur with Easterbrook, in his OP-ED article, that a start-up company may now be developing the first of a new breed of very low-cost vehicles. I know of at least one, and perhaps two companies whose designs much resemble the MCD/SLV. In the past, private companies have stumbled along the way, primarily due to lack of funds¹².

It appears, therefore, that the new "China Syndrome" will not end in the near future. The only ray of hope rests with the start-up companies. 

References

1. TIME Magazine, June 1, 1998, p 46
2. AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, April 13, 1998, p 23; April 20, 1998, p 25; May 11, 1998, p 55; May 25, 1998, p 19; June 1, 1998, p 22.
3. INTERNATIONAL SPACE INDUSTRY REPORT, April 9, 1998, p 2.
4. Gregg Easterbrook, "Big Dumb Rockets," NEWSWEEK; see summary of article in Column dated February 5, 1997.
5. Further discussion of this point may be found in Column dated January 26, 1997.
6. See Columns dated May 1 & 15, 1997.
7. For a discussion of Lt Col London's report see Column dated February 5, 1997.
8. FAS, MILITARY SPACE PROGRAMS, LAUNCH SUPPORT, Federation of American Scientists
9. Column dated October 10, 1997.
10. "DoD Reverses Strategy on Evolved Expendable Launcher," LAUNCHSPACE, April/May 1998. [link broken when checked in 2004]
    
11. One notable example of cost reduction is the development of the RS-68 oxygen/hydrogen engine for the EELV Delta 4. In this instance, the application of the MCD criteria is apparent. Compared with the Shuttle SSME engine, the RS-68 has 80% fewer parts. The nozzle appears to be made of laminate rather than fuel-cooled tubing. (See AVIATION WEEK & SPACE TECHNOLOGY, MAY 4, 1998, p 53.) Quoting from this page: "A major shift in management philosophy is leading the RS-68 development. Cost, not performance, is the focus - with performance viewed more in the context of what can be traded off for the sake of lowering cost or simplifying the design."
12. Column dated June 26, 1997.

Have you different views on the points discussed? [no discussions were submitted for this question]

This concludes the series of columns by Arthur Schnitt, originally published in 1997 and 1998.

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